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PUBLIC utility regulation is in urgent need of radical revision
in the opinion of nearly everyone associated with the recent
investigation authorized by the Legislature of the State of New
York.' It is a very significant fact that this demand for a
wide variety of changes was voiced not only by every member
of the Commission but almost without exception by the wit-
nesses-if one omits the representatives of the companies to
be regulated and the recent Chairman of the New York Com-
mission. Practically no one, unless it be the private interests
involved, seemed to want to sponsor regulation as now prac-
ticed. That there developed within the Commission itself dif-
ferences as to the method of rehabilitation, finally resulting in
majority and minority reports, was to have been expected; but
the unanimity with which even the more fundamental practices
of present day regulation were held to by open to change for
the better could not have been foreseen.
To gain some picture of the situation which created the ne-
cessity and the demand for this investigation one must take a
hasty glance at the history of regulation in New York State.
As the direct outcome of an investigation of the New York
Edison Company conducted in 1905 by Charles Evans Hughes
as counsel for the Stevens (Senate) Committee, New York in
1907 2 adopted regulation by commission "by reason of the evils
that existed under a system of control by the Legislature and
municipalities which was haphazard and erratic. Abuses had
grown up which could not effectively be met by direct legis-
ZConsulting E gineer in anagement, Philadelphia, Pa.; editor and
co-author of PunLIct UTILITY REGULATION (1924); author of numerous
articles on public utilities.
"The investigating Commission was appointed February 10, 1929, pur-
suant to Chapter 673 of the Laws of New York, 1929. It consisted of the
temporary President of the Senate, John Knight, Senators Warren T.
Thayer and William J. Hickey; three members of the Assembly, Speaker
Joseph A. McGinnies, Horace M. Stone and Russell G. Dunmore; and three
appointees of Governor Roosevelt, Frank P. Walsh, an attorney associated
for years with public causes and now resident in New York City, James C.
Bonbright of the faculty of Columbia University and David C. Adie, as-
sociated with charity organization work in Buffalo.
2 Prior to this time there had been a Gas & Electric Commission with
some regulatory powers but little or no control over rates.
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lative control. Attempts to control by municipal subdivisions
of the State were equally ineffective." 3
For some years after its establishment in New York, and
particularly during the term of Governor Hughes, regulation
worked with fair satisfaction to the public. Some of the more
outstanding abuses under the old system were promptly recti-
fied. The fact that the Commission began its operation in what
proved to be a period of falling rates helped it to gain the confi-
dence of the public. . But perhaps its greatest source of early
strength lay in the fact that the Commission operated primarily
as an administrative agency. On its own initiative it moved
to make the adjustments the demand for which had brought it
into being. The almost exclusively judicial character of the
later work of the Commission had not then begun to express
itself.
When the War came on and prices and operating expenses
generally rose, the commissions in New York and elsewhere
either actively or passively blocked the demands of the com-
panies for increased rates. After the War, however, the com-
panies became more insistent that the higher price levels be
recognized both in valuations and in the resulting tariffs.
While the theory of valuation based on reproduction-cost-new
less depreciation has been a factor in rate making ever since
the early days of regulation, it needed the higher post-war price
levels to give it vitality and secure the increasing recognition
shown by the later decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
More and more in recent years the public has felt baffled in
seeking to have its rights determined by a commission that
looked upon itself as a court appointed solely to try issues
brought before it on initiative other than its own. Further, the
public has more and more felt penalized by valuations which
have little relation to the amount of money actually invested in
the property and by rates which no one claims have a relation
to the cost of service.
This public restlessness found expression in a double leaded
four column editorial advocating an inquiry into the "operation
of the New York Public Service Commission" appearing in the
New York World on January 21, 1929, the opening paragraph
of which read:
"The high hopes with which the existing system of public
utility regulation was inaugurated in this State have not been
fulifilled. It is a fact beyond dispute that in certain important
respects this system has broken down."1
Within a few days thereafter bills calling for an investigation
3 From the majority report. See LEG. Doc. (1930) No. 75, p. 9.
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were introduced in the Legislature by both the Republican and
Democratic factions. The bill that ultimately passed,4 and re-
sulted in the inquiry of which this article is a review, certainly
afforded every opportunity to develop the situation. One can-
not but regret that it was not possible to follow the suggestion
of the World that both ex-Governor Hughes and ex-Governor
Smith be put on the Commission. In spite of what was on the
whole an ably conducted investigation, one senses a lack of
statesmanship in meeting the problems which it developed.
The Commission held hearings-about 40 in number-be-
tween October 9, 1929 and January 15, 1930, during the course
of which it heard 95 witnesses. The testimony ran nearly
6,000 pages with over 200 exhibits. The record has already
been issued to subscribers 5 and authorization has been secured
for its publication as a legislative document. The report of the
Commission as signed by the sLx majority members has been
published as Legislative Document (1930) No. 75 and with it
are included (1) the minority report and recommendations of
the three commissioners appointed by Governor Roosevelt, (2)
a lengthy and valuable analysis of the testimony by Colonel
William J. Donovan, Counsel to the Commission, and (3) sev-
eral appendices covering the electlic utility situation in foreign
countries. A map lithographed in colors showing the territory
occupied by the several operating companies in the States of
New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania was published as an
insert in the main report. 6
Credit is due to the Commission, its Counsel and its Research
Director, Dr. William E. Alosher7 for the effort constantly in
evidence to bring out through the witnesses the full range of
their possible contribution. There was little badgering of wit-
nesses-only the effort to develop the situation along a broad
and, it must be admitted, a complicated front. Even a casual
perusal of this record shows that the American problem of reg-
ulation is not as nearly solved as is sometimes believed.8
In the early discussions of what the report of the Commission
should contain there were no divisions; some very important
conclusions were unanimously, even if tentatively, adopted.
4 N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 673.
S It may be secured from the official State Stenographers, Marsball &
Munson, 150 Nassau St., New York City.
6 This may be secured from C. S. Wertsner & Son, 50 No. 13th St., Phila-
delphia.
7 Director of the School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse
University and author of ELECTRIC UTIrriEs-THE CRisis Iq PUBLIC Cox-
TROL (1929), which is as valuable a book on the utility situation as exists.
s "Our electrical utilities are regulated at earnings between 6 and 8 per
cent on their invested capital." From pamphlet reprint of a campaign
speech by Herbert Hoover dated Washington, D. C., Sept. 29, 1924.
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Before the end, however, the two factions in the Commission
drew completely away from each other over the question
whether "prudent investment" unimpaired or "reproduction-
cost-new" less depreciation should be used as the basis of valu-
ation for rate making purposesY That there was an element of
political strategy in the character of this division is too ap-
parent to be ignored. It is possible that the Administration,
represented by the minority, sought to emphasize, and even to
exaggerate, the area of difference in order to strengthen a very
handy campaign issue. On the other hand the majority showed
a disposition to minimize the importance of what was involved
in validating the valuation of existing property on the basis of
"the law of the land."- According to the record there were
no common findings. And yet this is far from the whole truth.
If differences as to valuation could have been adjusted, a unan-
imous and reasonably constructive report would apparently
have been possible.
As has been indicated it was the procedure to be followed in
fixing the rate base which emerged as the all-important issue.
In the words of the majority:
"There is no problem confronting the utility managements
and the public in any way comparable to the problem of valu-
ation. Upon its proper solution, as upon nothing else, depends
the future of public utility supervision and control." 1
Likewise states the minority:
"In our opinion the greatest single weakness of the existing
system of public utility regulation-and this applies not merely
to New York State but to the country as a whole-lies in the
hopeless difficulties inherent in the use of a physical valuation
of property as a basis of rate control."
Later I shall try to explain why .J believe the present relative
importance of the valuation element in the whole regulation
situation has been overemphasized. Nevertheless, in view of
decisions recently rendered by a majority of the United States
Supreme Court, the situation as of this date will have to be
9 Otherwise stated the question is: Shall the amount of return to be
allowed a given utility be figured on the actual fair investment in the
property or on the estinuted cost to reproduce the property at price levels
existing at the time the return is determined and the rates to produce this
return are adopted. In the first case the base on which the return is
figured is fairly stable, i.e. obtained from the books, and the rate of return
varied to meet conditions. In the second case the base constantly fluctuates
with the price level and the rate remains more or less stable--more often
at 7 per cent than otherwise.
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radically remodeled before regulation can be made to work with
reasonable satisfaction. The investigating Commission certainly
would have approved unanimously the statement quoted from
the Majority Report:
"The Supreme Court, the chief source of the definitions of
what constitutes value, is often divided within itself. Its deci-
sions, taken all together, lay the ground for methods of deter-
mining values that permit of a great variety of interpretations
and emphases. In these decisions intangibles are recognized,
concerning which the most expert technicians fail to agree.
The way is open for inflation of claims by the companies, which
if court decisions be taken as a criterion sometimes run into
hundreds of millions of dollars." 13
But beyond this agreement that present methods of valuation
are costly and cumbersome there developed differences of a
most radical character as to how a fair, workable and legally
sound rate base can be established.
In the determination of "a fair return on a fair value of the
property," as is held to be required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,24 the Supreme Court has in the past given recognition
to such factors as the original cost I* of the property, the his-
torical cost, the cost to reproduce the property more or less
exactly, the cost to reproduce a plant giving equivalent service,
the book value, the market value of the outstanding securities,
etc. Each of these indices was to be given its appropriate
weight in cases coming before the Court. But no formula cap-
able of general application and suggesting the relative impor-
tance of these several factors has been forthcoming. In one
case' current reproduction cost seemed to dominate the deter-
mination of "fair value" while in others;17 prudent investment
has received special consideration."" In recent cases,20 however,
1Ibid. 16.
4 Smythe v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
3.5 It is assumed, of course, that in reaching "fair value" an allowance
for depreciation vill be made no matter what variety of "cost" is used.
16 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Missouri, 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923).
1, Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct.
351 (1922); Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of
Georgia, 262 U. S. 625, 43 Sup. Ct. 680 (1923).
Is The United States Supreme Court has naturally been very chary of
approving actual investment, having been put on its guard in the early days
of rate making by all sorts of fraudulent and excessive alleged costs. For
an excellent statement on this point see People v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479,
104 N. E. 911 (1914). See also Donald Richberg's brief for the city of
Chicago in Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Chicago, 309 IIl. 40, 139 N. E.
867 (1923).




-and more particularly in the latest case 20..it is claimed that
present value interpreted to mean reproduction-cost-new less
depreciation 21 has been asserted with unmistakable emphasis
in the majority opinion. Against this a minority of the Court
has advocated strenuously unimpaired prudent investment as
the base upon which rates should be calculated. Thus it might
seem that an issue which has been discussed before the Su-
preme Court constantly throughout a full generation has now
become very definitely joined.
This question whether reproduction cost or prudent invest-
ment shall be given preference as the rate base is generally
considered the starting point in any discussion of regulation.
And yet the New York investigating Commission, in the selec-
tion and interrogation of witnesses, devoted almost no attention
to it. In fact the question was before the Commission at best
in a very uncertain way. Such discussion as there was had
really to do with the method of applying the one doctrine or
the other rather than with their respective merits. There are
indications that the minority, which outspokenly followed pru-
dent investment from the beginning, failed to realize as fully
as it might have the necessity for introducing into the record
the bases of its faith. While it is true that the arguments for
prudent investment were thoroughly developed in the very able
brief, The Basis of Rate Control, prepared by Commissioner
Bonbright and published as a section of the minority report, it
is also true that this brief does not rest in any large degree on
the testimony brought out at the hearings. In view of the
basic importance of the question, as well as the fact that opinions
of economists and other specialists who are known to favor the
actual cost basis of rate control were not secured, the majority
in control of the investigation cannot be absolved from respon-
sibility for keeping the record feeble on this point. Doubtless,
as the investigation developed, the difficulties of passing to the
prudent investment basis were emphasized. But in this field
no matter which way one turns apparently insuperable obstacles
are encountered. If regulation should fail and be superseded
by public ownership on a broad scale-the only alternative at
present in sight-an entirely different but nevertheless hercu-
lean set of problems will have to be solved.
20 United Railways & Electric Co. v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct. 123
(1930). In view of the frequency with which this case is cited in the testi-
mony and in the reports of this investigation it seems to be considered as
the Magna Carta of the reproduction-cost-new theory.
21 The decision does go so far as to provide for depreciation estimated on
a present value basis. Such a ruling introduces elements of both engineer-
ing and economics into accountancy. Depreciation entries will result, the
bases of which will be as elusive as will-o'-the-wisps.
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Certainly the following statement in the majority report,
while factually true, does not express the total situation:
"It is significant that none of the recognized economists and
price experts to whom the fundamental theory of this bill [the
minority's bill designed to give effect to prudent investment]
was presented were favorably disposed toward it." 2
The only witnesses who might fairly have been included under
the heading of a "recognized economist and price expert," were
President Arthur T. Hadley, Professor Irving Fisher, Professor
H. Parker Willis, and Professor Wesley C. Mitchell.
Professor Mitchell declined to express his opinion as to a
proper rate base on the ground that he was not an expert on
this question. Professor Fisher discussed the general princi-
ples of "reproduction costs" and "prudent investment costs"
and showed the impracticability of using the former as a basis
of valuation and rate making. He also showed the unfairness
of varying the money incomes of common stockholders by
means of a price index, while leaving bondholders, preferred
stockholders, and the consumers of public utility services partly
or wholly out of account. He advocated vigorously that "plu-
dent investment" should be taken as the basis of all rate sys-
tems and that the rates and valuations be readjusted at
convenient intervals by means of an index number, so as to
deal fairly with the consuming public on the one hand and with
investors of all classes on the other.
Professor Willis disapproved of actual cost as the rate base,
but he disapproved no less of the "present value" doctrine. In-
stead he favored a basis of rate control which followed his con-
ception of the law of competitive prices. This in effect means
that rates would be based on the estimated cost of reproducing
the service. President Hadley, while not favoring any rate
base whatever, thought that the so-called "present value!' doc-
trine was better than the actual cost doctrine because the
former was less apt to be observed in practice and would there-
fore allow companies to charge about what they choose.
Perhaps the attitude of the majority on this question is re-
flected by a statement of Dr. Mlosher-the Commission's able
and wholly open-minded director of research: "To expect the
Commissioners to advocate a measure [again referring to the
minority bill] upon which experts cannot agree, for which there
is no public demand, and against which the Supreme Court has
frequently ruled is, to say the least, naive." 23 Laying aside
the adequacy of this act to accomplish its avowed purpose, cer-
tainly it may be said that if Justices Louis D. Brandeis, Oliver
22 LEG. Doc. (1930) No. 75, p. 19.
23 See Letter to the Editor, NATION (May 28, 1930).
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Wendell Holmes and Harlan Fiske Stone of the United States
Supreme Court had not argued continually and cogently for
this same prudent investment theory, the valuation situation
would not have reached the point where everybody agrees that
something has to be done about it. If Theodore Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson had not advocated prudent investment it
would not now be fundamental to the Federal Water Power Act.
If Gifford Pinchot, George Woodruff and Philip P. Wells had
not been arguing for prudent investment for a quarter of a
century it would not now be incorporated in the Pennsylvania
Act authorizing the Department of Forestry to lease State lands
for power purposes.24 In spite of his consistent advocacy of un-
impaired prudent investment, Milo R. Maltbie is recognized as
one of the nation's greatest authorities on regulation and is
Chairnan of the Public Service Commission of the state of
New York.
Why should it be considered "naive" for statesmen to ad-
vocate for the United States a principle which by repeated Acts
of Parliament has been made "the law of the land" for Great
Britain? Or why should it be considered "naive" to advocate
measures simply because there was perhaps very slight chance
of their being passed at the particular session of the New York
Legislature at which this report was to be received? The
Water Power Act required 20 years for its passage through
Congress.
Once having reached the unanimous conclusion that the Su-
preme Court decisions as to valuation for rate making purposes
practically precluded effective regulation, the Commission split
six to three as to what to do about it. The majority took the
position that the recent decisions favoring reproduction-cost-
new constituted "the law of the land" and that this theory must
be part and parcel of whatever is done to give that degree of
stabilization to the rate base without which it was admitted
costs and rates could not satisfactorily be determined. So the
majority proposed to authorize the Public Service Commission
to negotiate contracts with each operating company settling the
value of its plant and property on a reproduction-cost-new
basis. The acceptance of these valuations was to be entirely
optional with the company. But once accepted they were to
remain fixed for approximately ten years except as increased
by new construction or diminished by routine depreciation. Ap-
parently adequate appropriations to cover the expense of mak-
ing these valuations, over a period of three years, were pro-
vided. The majority held that the adoption of its proposal
would enable the Commission to go into the valuation problem
as it never had before. With actual data for the rate base of
24 PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) § 1llSOa (1923).
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any given company, with the actual investment as the basis for
determining increases in such rate base during a period of ten
years, and with the requirement that at the end of that period
there should be a new deal in which, of course, any modifica-
tions in policy of the Supreme Court would be taken into ac-
count, some progress would surely be made. So runs the
contention of the majority. The minority claims that this legis-
lation would simply result in values "frozen" at present price
levels, which are high as compared with those which may be
expected to obtain during the next decade or two. Further,
and of even more importance in the opinion of the minority,
such a line of action would leave the main issue unsolved.
It is only fair to remind the reader that in any discussion
of the proper base upon which to figure earnings and rates ap-
propriate thereto, the interests and therefore the contentions
of the principals are apt to change with the changing economic
situation. Where the greater part of a given investment has
been made at prices higher than those prevailing at the time
the rates are to be determined, the public might be expected
to seek valuations based on present value. Indeed this was
exactly the contention of the public fifty years ago when rail-
road rates were frequently before our legislatures. On the
other hand, where a large part of the investment has been made
immediately before and after 1900 at price levels markedly
lower than the present, as is the case with most street rail-
roads today, it is natural for the managements of such com-
panies to seek the use of current prices in fixing the rate base.
But opportunism is not fit food for statesmanship in a technical
era.
The minority looked with less finality upon the present status
of valuation theory as apparently determined by Supreme
Court decisions and sought to avoid reproduction-cost-new by
having the Legislature authorize the Commission to make valu-
ations on a prudent investment basis but in so doing to accept
"the law of the land" for outlays already made. The minority
realized that the position of the Court, as it is currently as-
sumed to be by the general public, is based to a great extent
on pure dicta-what the Court has said-rather than on what
the Court has actually held. It was the theory of the minority's
bill that the Supreme Court would not blithely upset a scheme
of valuation for rate making purposes authorized by the
Legislature.
To rectify what is wrong with public utility regulation is
not an over-night job. Therefore we may well include in the
whole task the problem of providing the individual states with
valuation tools better than those which to date have been forged
by the Supreme Court. The decisions of the Supreme Court
1930]
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are the decisions of fallible men on matters involving judgment
and are therefore subject to the judgment of other men. If, as
seems to be the case, the rule of reproduction-cost-new less de-
preciation, claimed to have been legitimatized by the Supreme
Court, is unworkable as a practical matter in that it does not
provide the degree of stabilization required for effective regula-
tory control, it would seem to be the part of wisdom to explore
the various schemes by which the individual states may substi-
tute a more workable rule. In the Dartmouth College case the
Supreme Court ruled that state charters were not revocable.
The states met this hurdle by inserting a revocable clause in
all charters subsequently granted.
Just as the minority of the New York investigating Commis-
sion sought legislative sanction for prudent investment, so
apparently the Interstate Commerce Commission is inviting
Congress through legislative enactment to erect a bulwark
against the current Supreme Court position. A letter recently
sent by the Interstate Commerce Commission to the Interstate
Commerce Committee of the Senate recommends that Congress
stipulate the method by which the Commission shall value the
railways for purposes of rate-making, re-capture, etc., in order
to "reduce the task of bringing valuations up to date to a
purely accounting process." Under the proposed method valua-
tion could be determined at any time "by taking the cost of re-
production new at the 1914 unit prices of the property existing
oi the original valuation data, plus the value of the lands, add-
ing or subtracting the subsequent net increase in the property
investment account as shown by the accounts, when correctly
kept, adding further a proper allowance for working capital,
and deducting the balance standing in the depreciation
reserve." 25
In the present writer's opinion the majority of the investigat-
ing Commission erred in acquiescing in a theory of valuation
under which regulation must ultimately fail. It simply accepts
reproduction-cost-new with all its fictions and uncertainties, not
to say injustices, as "the law of the land" and seeks some meas-
ure of stabilization through a ten year period. The reproduc-
tion-cost-new theory of valuation for rate making purposes
seems wholly unworkable from an administrative point of
view.26 I fully agree with the testimony of Chairman Atwill
of the Massachusetts Public Service Commission that unless
we can substitute for reproduction-cost-new a more stable and
easily ascertained rate base,27 such as prudent investment, reg-
25 REPORT OF WILLIAMI J. DONOVAN, LEG. Doc. (1930) No. 75, p. 96.
26 Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Shoring up the Regulation of Electrical Utili-
ties, (1930) 8 HARV. Bus. REV. 316.
27 "Fair value is so argumentative a term, and its determination so long
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ulation as a public policy must fail and be superceded by public
ownership. The same thought was expressed by the minority:
"Unless effective regulation can be enforced the people will
conclude that public ownership is the only alternative to con-
tinued exploitation by unregulated private monopoly." g
But on the other hand the difficulties to be encountered in
substituting another rule such as prudent investment in the
face of the Supreme Court decisions are admittedly very great.
In recent years suggestions as to how this might be accom-
plished have been multiplying. Five distinct procedures can
be identified as (1) the Wells or Pennsylvania plan, (2) the
Massachusetts plan, (3) the Bennett plan (Wisconsin), (4) the
Bauer plan, and (5) the Bonbright plan-the last two fully de-
veloped in the testimony and in the minority report of the in-
vestigating Commission.
Under each of these plans it is contemplated that there shall
be exerted some measure of "pressure" on the private com-
panies to induce them to accept prudent investment. Some
varieties of pressure are undoubtedly legitimate and would be
sustained both by public opinion and by the courts. As an
instance there might be cited the minority's bill to facilitate the
building of publicly-owned municipal distribution systems. It
does not make much difference whether the pressure be exerted
by legislative fiat or by commission ruling, except that a con-
tinuing agency such as a full time commission can usually act
more gracefully and in such a way as to have its acts better
understood.
The Pennsylvania plan devised by Philip P. Wells during the
administration of Governor Pinchot provided that:.
"In the making and regulation of the rates of any electric
utility which is hereafter incorporated, such rates shall be made
or fixed as to afford such electric utility from its business as a
whole if efficiently conducted, a reasonable opportunity for a
return upon its net investment plus its additional fair value,
if any, at a rate reasonably sufficient from time to time to at-
tract into the enterprise new money in sufficient volume to
meet the needs of its public service duty." 20
Well's plan provided for a contract under which the company
accepted Aet investment as the rate base, i.e., prudent invest-
drawn out on any given occasion that as a practical matter it fails in any-
thing like prompt effectiveness-and promptness is the essence of justice."
REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE SECURITIES COMMITTEE, IM.EST1ENT
BANKERs ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (Mlay 1930).
28 LEG. Doc. (1930) No. 75, P. 245.
2 See Senate Bill No. 34 (Extraordinary Session 1926). See also AMa.




ment less depreciation or prudent investment unimpaired, for
all additions to plant and property made after the execution of
the contract. For property already owned on the date of the
contract Wells permitted the utility to secure any valuation it
could under the present "law of the land." Wells recognized
the difficultieg in making prudent investment retroactive but
recognized as well that the electrical industry is young and
has its major investments yet to make. In order to get started
on the new basis he ran some risk of an excessive valuation on
plant and property already acquired.
Under this plan any company not agreeing to accept prudent
investment by contract within a reasonable time was to be
deprived of these privileges:
(a) Eminent domain.
(b) Ownership or voting of stock, etc. in any other electric
utility.
(c) Right to begin exercise of rights under municipal fran-
chise.
(d) Incorporation, renewal or amendment of charter.
(e) Merger with another utility, etc.
As a matter of fact, as a preliminary to the possible passage
of this act, these and other privileges were withheld over a
period of months and no relatively important public inconven-
ience resulted.
As explained to the investigating Commission by Messrs. At-
will and Goldberg of the Massachusetts Public Service Com-
mission, the utilities of that state have been on a basis somewhat
analogous to prudent investment for over a century. This has
been effected not so much by any checking of the value of the
assets as by fixing rates so as to yield on the capital stock and
premium a rate of return which is varied according to the
judgment of the Commission, taking into account "the efficiency
of the company, the efficiency of its management, the question
whether it has placed back earnings into additions to the plant,
the amount of depreciation it has taken, the amount of its
surplus." Only four appeals 10 have been taken from Massachu-
setts Commission rate decisions in fifty years. In the one taken
to the State Supreme Court the Commission was sustained.
The three appeals taken to the Federal Courts wer4 all with-
drawn. In order to protect itself against the possible implica-
tions of recent Supreme Court decisions the Massachusetts
30 Worcester Electric Light Co. v. Atwill, 23 F. (2d) 891 (D. Mass. 1927) ;
Cambridge Electric Light.Co. v. Atwill, 25 F. (2d) 485 (D. Mass. 1928);
Haverill Gas Light Co. v. Gas and Electric Commissioners (Finally aban-
doned in 1914); Dunham v. Public Service Commissioners, 232 Mass. 309,
122 N. E. 397 (1919).
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Commission has recommended legislation somewhat along the
lines of the Pennsylvania plan.
Edward Bennett, Professor of Electrical Engineering at the
University of Wisconsin, has prepared an act in which it is
provided:
"If at any time after the lapse of one year from the date
of the passage of this statute it should be found that any pub-
lic utility has failed to petition this Commission to find and
declare the prudent investment base of its properties, such fail-
ure shall be taken to be prima facie evidence that public con-
venience and necessity warrant the operation of a competing
utility or utilities in the territory or any part of the territory
served by the utility so failing." 3 '
In some parts of the country this variety of pressure would
probably be effective. But where electrical development has
been at all active the time may have passed.
Under the Bauer plan the Public Service Commission would
be authorized by the Legislature to make valuations of all utility
property, using current Supreme Court decisions as the guide,
with additions to the property to be made at actual cost. This
is the Pennsylvania plan without the contract, without the con-
sent of the company. In place of pressure on the company to
be exerted by the Commission, as by withholding certificates
of convenience for new construction, there is substituted the
legislative fiat.
The Bonbright plan is essentially the Bauer plan but with
minor changes made to meet criticisms which have developed
since Dr. Bauer first promoted this idea. Among these changes
is a clause which permits the shift from one basis of valuation
to the other to be effected by contract.
From a more immediate point of view it seems probable that
the relative importance of the valuation factor in the whole
scheme of utility regulation has been greatly over-emphasized.
With the public service commissions in New York and else-
where sitting virtually as courts, and with most of their time
and thought devoted to questions of valuation, nothing else
could have happened. The administrative phases of their task
have been correspondingly neglected. It should be noted that
in undertaking to operate in this field the commissions have
chosen ground where the utilities are strongest. In the last
twenty years the utilities have schooled a veritable army of
lawyers, accountants, "economists," public relations experts,
valuation engineers, et al. in the attenuated philosophy of re-
production-cost-new112 as well as in the minutiae with which it
31 See Bennett, The Inadequacy of the Public Utilities Law of Wiscoain,
UN v srry OP WISCONSIN STUDIES IN ELECmICAL ENGINEERING, RE:FOT
No. 18.
- See Cooke, op. cit. supra note 26.
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is made effective. Hence the commissions would be well ad-
vised from the standpoint of strategy-if for no other reason-
to seek other ground on which to set up the controls needed for
the protection of the public interest.
Given a commission with the ambition to make regulation
effective and with reasonable appropriations at its disposal, it
is the writer's opinion that a very important advance can be
made within the provisions of any of the more comprehensive
regulatory acts and in spite of the immediate difficulties raised
by recent Supreme Court decisions. A vigorous administrative
attitude toward accounting-including the classification of ac-
counts, reporting, standardization and simplification of rate
structures, cost finding, consolidations, mergers and other inter-
company relationships-accompanied by an entirely unknown
degree of publicity would effect something akin to a revolution.
If the present foggy mass of uncertainties concerning the man-
agement and business status of utilities were replaced by defi-
nite, understandable facts the basis for many disagreements in
judgment would disappear. The commissions must take into
their confidence both the legislature for whom they act and the
public whose interests they are supposed to protect. A more
aggressive attitude on the part of the New York Commission
will be facilitated by a considerable increase in its appropria-
tion making possible the addition of 50 or 60 employees. This,
the first important increase in its staff since regulation was
established, is a result of the recent investigation.
Under the variety of accounting methods permitted by our
commissions, many of the facts most significant from a public
point of view have been entirely covered up. Through the fail-
ure properly to segregate capital and operating expenditures
under the major headings of generation, transmission, distri-
bution and general, many of the commonly accepted statistics
of the industry are misleading. The securing of costs has been
made all but impossible. All this was very adequately covered
by Judson C. Dickerman in his report to the investigating Com-
mission entitled Annual Reports Required of Public Utilities by
State Public Service Commissions,3 which was a discussion of
the objectives in requiring, and of the methods of obtaining,
reports useful for regulating purposes. As pointed out in the
minority report, the New York Commission does not regulate
the amount of the accrued depreciation reserve nor does it deter-
mine the annual return and charge to the reserve. All this is
left entirely to the discretion of the company, and each company
follows its own policy-a policy apt to change with the neces-
sities of the moment.
Counsel Donovan in his report recommends improvements in
33 Unfortunately this report has not as yet been published.
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statistics, but as to the possibility of practicing cost finding in
the electrical industry he advocates only further research. In
justification he cites a recent statement of Commissioner Joseph
B. Eastman of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the ef-
fect that much must be done along lines of research before
cost keeping can be generally introduced as a feature of rail-
road operation.24 He failed to notice, however, that in the same
memorandum Commissioner Eastman commented very favor-
ably upon a system of cost finding in the electrical industry
fully described in testimony before the Interstate Commerce
Commission.- There are many reasons why the problem of
cost finding on steam railroads differs radically from that on
electrical utilities. Only through cost finding can justice be
done as between different classes of consumers.20
The majority report recommends the appointment of "a divi-
sional head in the Public Service Commission to be responsible
for stimulating a plan of area development of rural electrifica-
tion." 37 This is especially interesting as general rural electric
service can only be effected through development on an area
basis. The territory must be completely covered if construc-
tion costs are to be kept at a minimum. What has come to be
known as the Adirondack Plan for rural electrical development,
which is mentioned with approval in the majority report, is not
rural electrification in the sense that the term is used in On-
tario, or in Sweden, Bavaria or even parts of France where over
great areas practically every farm is connected. In the half
of Alsace which is served from Strassburg every rural home
has service. Such a situation is not unusual in Europe. The
customers of the Adirondack Plan are very largely the resi-
dents of unincorporated villages or towns, or of areas imme-
diately adjacent thereto.
In discussing rural electrification (statistics as furnished by
the Empire State Gas & Electric Association) mention is made
of densities of from 17 to 19 customers to the mile. Densities
do not run anything like this in farming districts. In Ontario
3 4 Eastman, General Review of Accounting Rules for Steam Railroads,
REPORT iN Ex PARTE 91 (Aug. 15, 1929).
3 3Hudson W. Reed, Cost Finding for the Electrical Utilities, BULLcrTI op
THE TAYLOR SocmTy (April 1929). Engineering Societies Bldg., 29 W.
39 St., New York City.
36 See Worcester Electric Light Co. v. Atwill, s-upr, note 30. Master's
decision filed February 11, 1929.
7 One of the enacted bills provides that the Public Service Commission
"shall appoint a qualified person -whose duty it shall be to formulate and
encourage the carrying out of plans of rural electrification, to make re-
search on area developments, line problems, methods of financing increased
use of farm appliances and similar matters, and to hold hearings in con-
nection with proposed measures for accomplishing the above-naxned objects."
An adequate appropriation for carrying on the work was provided.
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rural rates are based on three to a mile and over. General Rule
No. 27 of the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, passed
during Governor Pinchot's term of office, provided that there
should be no extra charge unless the number of customers was
less than three to the mile.
Counsel Donovan says in his report that "a full use of elec-
tricity is not approached in areas where the total cost of serv-
ice is above 6 cents per k.w.h. Total costs refers not only to
the energy charge but to line extension charges as well." I'8 Such
rates are not generally feasible under the Adirondack Plan. As-
suming one customer per mile, under the Adirondack Plan the
monthly minimum is stated to be $24.00. This implies a custo-
mer investment of about $2600 to the mile39 $1100 to the mile
is a line cost which can easily be obtained in most rural areas,
and $100 will ordinarily cover the cost of the transformer and
other items required for an individual service.
Some idea of the distance we lave yet to go in effecting rural
electrification is furnished by this statement of Otto M. Rau
who made the rural electrification study for the investigating
Commission:
"In the absence of definite data such as will result from the
forthcoming U. S. Census one hesitates to be too definite about
the percentage of farms which have service. My judgment,
however, is that this percentage does not exceed fifteen and may
not be above twelve. The figures issued by the companies are
undoubtedly too inclusive." 40
The majority report carried a recommendation for a com-
mission to study and report upon interstate problems affecting
regulation, including the feasibility of action with neighboring
states through compacts as provided for by the Federal Con-
stitution. It was suggested that the same body make a general
survey of the power needs of New York and consider the pos-
sibility of unifying the necessary service with those of other
states. Unfortunately no legislative action on this was taken.
A large number of bills carrying out the ideas of both the
majority and minority were introduced into the Legislature. Of
those advocated by the majority 27 were passed 41-many of
them varying widely from the form in which they were intro-
duced. Of the four bills of major importance which were
passed, the first provided for a statewide general valuation of
3 8 LEG. Doc. (1930) No. 75, p. 180.
39 $24 times 12 months gives as an annual charge $288 which divided
by 11 per cent asgumed as an allowance for fixed charges-including inter-
est, taxes, depreciation, etc.,-gives a cost of approximately $2600 a mile.
$1600 stated to be the cost per mile used in arriving at these rates would
imply fixed charges 18 per cent-an unthinkable allowance.
40 See page 1 of this report, which has not been published.
41N. Y. Laws 1929, no. 373, 760-761, 773-793, 829, 850, 865.
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utility properties; the second, for rate-making contracts be-
tween the state and the companies; the third, for the creation
of a public defender in utility cases; and the fourth, for the
extension of control over contracts with holding and affiliated
companies. Governor Roosevelt vetoed the first three of these
bills. The accompanying messages will prove of very great in-
terest to any student of regulation. It is possible that the bill
giving to the Public Service Commission considerably more
power in dealing with holding companies, however, will prove
to be the outstanding accomplishment of this investigation.
Holding companies thoroughly dominate the policy of the oper-
ating companies in almost every important direction. It is prob-
able that a good deal of legislative experimentation will be re-
quired before effective control over holding company operations
is established. It will be interesting to see how effective these
new efforts at control prove to be.-
It is highly significant that even the recommendations of the
majority as to legislation-many of them tacitly concurred in
by the minority-were opposed by the private companies in toto.
The attitude of the acknowledged leaders of the industry ap-
peared to be against any effort to strengthen regulation, in
fact, to be against any change whatsoever.
The thoroughness of the investigation and the publicity which
its deliberations and findings have received certainly put the
issues in the hands of the public in a new way. But whether
it is humanly possible to establish a generally effective regula-
tory control in this situation-admitted almost unanimously to
require a new deal-is decidedly open to doubt. The very
dynamics of the electrical industry discourage interference what-
ever the purpose. Power-the master-key to industrial progress
and material well-being-is only at the tlueshold of its infi-
nite usefulness. No industry ever commanded the services of
such an army of educated and skilled employees. Technical re-
search already organized along a broad front yields immediate
and abundant returns. Capital is attracted to the various
branches of the industry-operating and manufacturing-in un-
precedented volume. The accommodation of public relations on
a national as well as an international scale has been carried far.
The present-day tempo of corporate organization offers re-
wards "beyond the dreams of avarice" to those at key positions.
Can or cannot such an enterprise in private hands be controlled
in the public interest? This in brief is the query posed by the
New York investigation.
42 The effectiveness of this new act-much amended in its passage through
the Legislature-has been questioned by the Public Service Commission in
its recent refusal to permit the Broolvlyn Union Gas Company to sell its
Greenpoint coke oven plant to a subsidiary of the Koppers Company.
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